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NOTES
FROM HUMPHREY’S  EXECUTOR TO SEILA  LAW :




In the summer of 2019, the Department of Justice and Federal Trade
Commission announced that they would be dividing the investigations into
four of the biggest American tech firms, with the DOJ investigating Google
and Apple and the FTC investigating Amazon and Facebook.  Senator Mike
Lee was among the decision’s many critics; he argued that the “splitting of
this tech antitrust review across two federal agencies, despite the many similar
competition issues that will be investigated, illustrates the absurdity of having
two federal agencies handling civil antitrust enforcement.”1  But even this
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School, Class of 2021; Bachelor of
Science in Biological Sciences, University of Notre Dame, 2017.  I would like to thank
Professor Roger Alford and Brandon Winchel for their support and excellent feedback.  I
would also like to thank the wonderful editors of the Notre Dame Law Review, whose
attention to detail and commitment to excellence are unparalleled.  Finally, I would like to
thank my parents and Professor O. Carter Snead for their constant support throughout law
school.  All errors are my own.
1 Mike Lee, Just One Agency Should Enforce Antitrust Law, WASH. EXAM’R (June 17,
2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/just-one-agency-should-
enforce-antitrust-law; see also Diane Bartz & Dan Grebler, Republican Senator Criticizes Poten-
tial Dual U.S. Antitrust Tech Probes, REUTERS (June 12, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/us-usa-tech-congress/republican-senator-criticizes-potential-dual-u-s-antitrust-tech-
probes-idUSKCN1TD2RN (quoting Senator Lee as stating that “[g]iven the similarity in
competition issues involved, divvying up these investigations is sure to waste resources, split
valuable expertise across the agencies, and likely result in divergent antitrust
enforcement”).
395
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“brokered peace didn’t last long,”2 and it soon became clear that the DOJ
and FTC would be conducting overlapping investigations.3
The DOJ and FTC have shared civil antitrust enforcement since the early
1900s,4 and although their authority is not identical, “the core of the agen-
cies’ jurisdiction is congruent.”5  This dual enforcement structure has been
continuously challenged for the better half of the last century by both aca-
demics and government actors,6 although conventional wisdom holds that
elimination of either agency’s civil antitrust authority would be politically
costly.7  There are well-recognized efficiency costs to the dual enforcement
structure, including the expensive and time-consuming merger-clearance
process.8  The two agencies often compete in “turf wars” over cases,9 and
have even filed amicus briefs against each other in federal court,10 raising
serious questions of government efficiency and procedural and substantive
fairness.
But in addition to the well-worn complaints about efficiency and fair-
ness, there are significant, mounting reasons to subject this dual enforce-
2 Ben Brody & David McLaughlin, FTC Turns Up Heat with Justice Department in Dueling
Tech Probes, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-
02-13/ftc-turns-up-heat-with-justice-department-in-dueling-tech-probes.
3 See id. (noting the FTC made “sweeping request[s]” to Facebook, Amazon, Google,
Apple, and Microsoft for non-public information under the FTC Act); David McLaughlin
& Chris Strohm, William Barr’s Antitrust Power Play Is Just What Trump Wants, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-10-21/william-barr-s-
antitrust-power-play-is-just-what-trump-wants.
4 History of the Antitrust Division, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/his-
tory-antitrust-division (Dec. 13, 2018); Our History, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.
gov/about-ftc/our-history (last visited Aug. 11, 2020).
5 William E. Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is It Time to End Dual Federal Enforcement?, 41
ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 523–24 (1996) (“Only the DOJ can enforce the Sherman Act crimi-
nally, and the FTC alone can enforce the ban in section 5 of the FTC against unfair meth-
ods of competition.  But . . . [t]he DOJ and the FTC share power to enforce the Clayton
Act, and the FTC may use section 5 to reach conduct that the DOJ prosecutes civilly under
the Sherman Act.”).
6 See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 127
(2007); Eleanor M. Fox, Antitrust and Institutions: Design and Change, 41 LOY. U. CHI. L.J.
473, 486–87 (2010); Ernest Gellhorn, Charles A. James, Richard Pogue & Joe Sims, Has
Antitrust Outgrown Dual Enforcement?  A Proposal for Rationalization, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 695,
713–14 (1990); Kovacic, supra note 5, at 538–40; Lee, supra note 1; William Simon, The
Case Against the Federal Trade Commission, 19 U. CHI. L. REV. 297, 297 (1952).
7 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 130.
8 See id. at 130–31.
9 Lauren Feiner, Here’s Why the Top Two Antitrust Enforcers in the US Are Squabbling over
Who Gets to Regulate Big Tech, CNBC (Sept. 18, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/18/
the-ftc-and-doj-are-squabbling-over-the-right-to-regulate-big-tech.html; John D. McKinnon
& James V. Grimaldi, Justice Department, FTC Skirmish over Antitrust Turf, WALL ST. J., https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-ftc-skirmish-over-antitrust-turf-11564997402
(Aug. 5, 2019).
10 See, e.g., Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appel-
lant and Vacatur, FTC v. Qualcomm Inc., 969 F.3d 974 (9th Cir. 2019) (No. 19-16122).
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ment authority to constitutional evaluation, especially in light of recent
doctrinal shifts regarding the constitutionality of independent agencies.  Last
term, the Supreme Court held in Seila Law that the independence of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) was an unconstitutional vio-
lation of the separation of powers, shrinking Humphrey’s Executor down to a
very thin, very wobbly protection of the FTC’s constitutionality.  Aggrieved
parties are already challenging FTC actions on a range of constitutional
grounds,11 and the majority opinion in Seila Law provides a roadmap for
doing so.
This Note catalogues and proposes solutions to both the traditional con-
cerns of efficiency and fairness and the modern constitutional problems
posed by the current dual enforcement structure.  Part I will compare the
two antitrust agencies on the basis of their structures, accountability, statu-
tory authority, and enforcement procedures, as well as evaluate potential con-
cerns with vesting either agency with the sole authority to enforce civil
antitrust laws.  Part II will evaluate the perils of the current dual enforcement
structure, exploring both the traditional arguments about efficiency and fair-
ness and the modern constitutional challenges.  Part III will evaluate poten-
tial legislative solutions to the problem of dual antitrust enforcement
authority in the United States.  The constitutionality of the FTC’s status as an
independent agency is again under serious question; it is time for Congress
to seriously rethink and restructure civil antitrust authority accordingly.
I. COMPARISON OF THE AGENCIES
Although the DOJ and FTC’s overlapping jurisdiction is heavily criti-
cized, there are potential problems posed by giving either agency the exclu-
sive authority to enforce civil antitrust laws.  This Part will analyze those
concerns, starting with each agency’s structure, accountability, statutory
authority, and enforcement procedures.
11 See, e.g., Notice of Tentative Ruling at 3, Axon Enter. Inc. v. FTC, 452 F. Supp. 3d
882 (D. Ariz. 2020) (No. 20-cv-0014) (“[F]irst, that the FTC’s structure violates Article II of
the Constitution because its commissioners are not subject to at-will removal by the Presi-
dent and its administrative law judges (‘ALJs’), who are appointed by its commissioners,
are also insulated from at-will removal; second, that the FTC’s combined role of ‘prosecu-
tor, judge, and jury’ during administrative proceedings violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment; and third, that the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the U.S.
Department of Justice, which are both responsible for reviewing the antitrust implications
of acquisitions but employ different procedures and substantive standards when con-
ducting such review, utilize an arbitrary and irrational ‘clearance’ process when deciding
which agency will review a particular acquisition, in violation of the Equal Protection
Clause . . . .”).
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A. The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
1. Structure and Accountability
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is headed by an
Assistant Attorney General, who reports to the Associate Attorney General
and is ultimately accountable to the President.12  All officers in the DOJ serve
at the pleasure of the President; no removal restrictions protect the Attorney
General, Associate Attorney General, or the officers of the Antitrust Divi-
sion.13  As such, the policy positions and enforcement actions of the Antitrust
Division are properly attributed to the Attorney General and the President.
The Antitrust Division is divided into several sections that report to the Assis-
tant Attorney General, including Civil Sections, Criminal Sections, Economic
Analysis Group, and other offices such as the International Section.14
2. Antitrust Enforcement Authority & Procedures
The Antitrust Division is empowered by the Sherman and Clayton Acts,
which give the Division authority to enforce both civil and criminal antitrust
laws.15  All enforcement of antitrust laws by the Division must take place in
the federal courts.16  The Division must prove violations of antitrust laws to a
federal judge, “who will examine the matter without deference to the Divi-
sion’s views.”17  Accordingly, enforcement proceedings are governed by
either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.18  Failure to abide by the applicable procedural rules results in
the exclusion of evidence and potential sanctions against the Division.19  In
civil cases, the Division can issue information compulsory requests through
subpoenas, “[s]econd [r]equests,” and Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs);
CIDs and subpoenas are subject to judicial review, while second requests can
only be appealed internally.20
The Division also shares jurisdiction with the FTC for mergers subject to
notification and review under the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements
Act (HSR Act).21  This statute provides the two agencies only thirty days after
notification to investigate the merger; if either agency determines that more
12 Organizational Chart, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/agencies/chart
(last visited Feb. 5, 2018).
13 See Gellhorn et al., supra note 6, at 732.
14 Sections and Offices, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/atr/sections-and-
offices (last updated June 17, 2020).
15 ANTITRUST DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., TEMPLATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 3(a) OF THE
ICN FRAMEWORK ON COMPETITION AGENCY PROCEDURES 1.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 2.
19 Id. at 3.
20 Id. at 4 (first citing 15 U.S.C. § 1314 (2012); and then citing FED. R. CRIM. P.
17(c)(2)).
21 Id. at 1, 4.
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time or information is needed, the agency can issue a second request.22  Dur-
ing that same thirty days, the Division and the FTC must decide which agency
will evaluate the transaction at issues through the “clearance” process.23
When the Division decides to challenge anticompetitive mergers, it seeks
both preliminary and permanent injunctions in federal district court.24
3. Potential Problems with Sole Enforcement Authority
One persistent concern with lodging any, let alone all, antitrust enforce-
ment power in the DOJ is the fear that antitrust statutes will be used by the
President for political purposes.  The DOJ has, recently and historically, been
criticized as such.25  This criticism has been directed toward the Trump
administration, in light of the President’s public distaste for CNN, when the
Division sought to enjoin the merger of AT&T and CNN’s parent company,
Time Warner.26  Most recently, the Antitrust Division was accused of improp-
erly investigating cannabis mergers.  Obama’s Assistant Attorney General, Bill
Baer wrote that the investigations “reek[ed] of an effort to use law enforce-
ment to burden an industry Barr dislikes” in a Washington Post op-ed.27  A
whistleblower from inside the Division testified to Congress that the investiga-
tions “were motivated by the fact that the cannabis industry is unpopular ‘on
the fifth floor,’ a reference to Attorney General Barr’s offices in the DOJ
headquarters building.”28
22 Id. at 4–5 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 18a(b)(1)(B), (e)(1)(A) (2012)).
23 See infra notes 122–25 and accompanying text.
24 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 130.
25 Gellhorn et al., supra note 6, at 703 (“[A]t times [the DOJ] has been criticized for
being too accommodating to the political desires of the executive branch.”); see also Brody
& McLaughlin, supra note 2 (“Some antitrust experts found [Sen. Hawley’s] suggestion
worrisome, coming as Barr is accused of politicizing [the Department of Justice] by doing
President Donald Trump’s bidding, rather than following the rule of law.  Similar allega-
tions have been aimed at Barr’s antitrust chief, Makan Delrahim, whose division will take
the unusual step of presenting arguments in federal court on Thursday against the FTC in
a case involving mobile phone chipmaker Qualcomm Inc.—a former Delrahim client.”);
Lauren Feiner, DOJ’s Antitrust Chief Said He Talks to Trump But Not About Important Mergers,
CNBC (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/11/06/doj-antitrust-chief-makan-
delrahim-says-he-talks-to-president-trump.html. See generally Chris Strohm, Barr Unleashes
Justice Department Turmoil over Stone Case, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 12, 2020), https://www.bloom
berg.com/news/articles/2020-02-12/barr-unleashes-justice-department-turmoil-over-roger-
stone-case (noting criticism that the DOJ’s law enforcement is improperly influenced by
politics).
26 See, e.g., Hadas Gold, Report: Trump Asked Gary Cohn to Block AT&T–Time Warner
Merger, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2019/03/04/media/att-time-warner-trump-gary-
cohn/index.html (last updated Mar. 4, 2019) (“At the heart of the theories is Trump’s
public dislike of CNN, which was a division of Time Warner.”).
27 Bill Baer, Opinion, Think the DOJ’s Antitrust Division Is Immune from Political Meddling?
Think Again., WASH. POST (June 24, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/
2020/06/24/think-dojs-antitrust-division-is-immune-political-meddling-think-again/.
28 Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 6 (2020) (statement of John
W. Elias, Former Chief of Staff, Antitrust Div.). But see Memorandum from Jeffrey R. Rag-
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The Division’s enforcement is also criticized for its use of nonexpert,
generalist federal judges as adjudicators in complicated economic cases.
This was a major reason why the FTC was established in the first place—the
FTC was meant to serve as an “expert body to resolve what are essentially
questions of economic policy”29 that some thought could not properly be
resolved in front of “conservative federal judges [who] were not the ideal
guardians of consumer welfare.”30  The problem of nonexpert judges was
resurfaced in a very public way by the Division itself in the 2018 AT&T–Time
Warner case when the DOJ criticized the federal district court judge for
“erroneously ignoring fundamental principles of economics and common
sense.”31  But the D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment,32 in
part because findings of fact in such cases are reviewed under the “clearly
erroneous” standard.33  This deference to the trial court’s findings of fact
makes the identity of the assigned district court judge massively important to
the DOJ’s ability to enjoin anticompetitive mergers.  Ernest Gellhorn and his
coauthors raised this concern in 1990, writing that
[a]lthough the FTC system of administrative litigation has its drawbacks, the
placement of all antitrust enforcement in the federal courts is not necessarily
a panacea.  The federal judiciary has been very uneven in its sophistication
regarding antitrust issues.  By the luck of the draw, judges with no prior eco-
nomic, regulatory or antitrust experience whatsoever can be thrust into the
role of deciding questions of major economic significance.34
A more recent, albeit indirect, criticism of the Division’s antitrust
authority is that it is divorced from consumer protection.  Bill Kovacic, who
sdale, Dir. and Chief Couns., U.S. Dep’t of Just. Off. of Pro. Resp. to Bradley Weinsheimer,
Assoc. Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. (June 11, 2020), https://www.justsecurity.org/
wp-content/uploads/2020/06/opr-memorandum-from-jeffrey-ragsdale-to-bradley-weins
heimer-june-11-2020.pdf (“The cannabis industry provided a unique challenge to federal
and state regulators alike, and it was reasonable for ATR to seek additional information
from the industry through its Second Request process.”); Roger Alford, Regarding Those
Marijuana Mergers: A Response to Accusers Who Question the DOJ, JUST SEC. (July 13, 2020),
https://www.justsecurity.org/71295/regarding-those-marijuana-mergers-a-response-to-
accusers-who-question-the-doj/ (“Given that both the Obama and Trump Administrations
made clear that the mass commercialization of the sale and distribution of marijuana could
implicate companies in criminal violations under the Controlled Substances Act, it is not
surprising that the Antitrust Division would seek guidance on the critical questions of the
constitutional laws and obligations as they relate to possible admissions of criminal con-
duct by these companies merely with the required submission of merger applications.”).
29 Gellhorn et al., supra note 6, at 734.
30 Id. at 699.
31 Cecilia Kang, Judge in AT&T Case Ignored ‘Economics and Common Sense,’ Government
Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/06/technology/att-
time-warner-merger-appeal.html.
32 United States v. AT&T, Inc., 916 F.3d 1029, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 2019).
33 Id. at 1033.
34 Gellhorn et al., supra note 6, at 734.
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served as a Commissioner for the FTC from 2006–2011,35 noted in a recent
speech that part of what makes the FTC’s model successful is that more than
half of modern competition agencies are tasked with “something other than
competition law,” most frequently consumer protection.36  He noted that
this pairing is “a decided advantage” and offered that the FTC should “con-
sider perhaps as a priority how to work in particular with agencies with a
similar configuration with the aim of exploiting the full value inherent in the
multidimensional mandate.”37
B. The Federal Trade Commission
1. Structure and Accountability
The Federal Trade Commission is an independent federal agency within
the executive branch charged with enforcing both competition and con-
sumer protection laws.  The FTC is led by five Commissioners, one of which
is chosen by the President to act as Chairman.38  The Commission is biparti-
san, meaning that “[n]o more than three Commissioners can be of the same
political party,”39 but the Commission does not have to vote by consensus.40
Each Commissioner must be nominated by the President and confirmed by
the Senate, and all are appointed for terms of seven years.41  All five current
Commissioners were nominated by President Trump in 2018, which means
that for the first two years of his presidency, none of the Commissioners had
been chosen by the sitting president.42  This is not uncommon; President
Obama did not make his first appointment until April of 2010.43  The Com-
mission’s appropriations come from Congress.44
The Federal Trade Commission Act states that “[a]ny Commissioner
may be removed by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfea-
sance in office,”45 which was interpreted in the famous46 case of Humphrey’s
35 Commissioners, Chairwomen and Chairmen of the Federal Trade Commission, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Nov. 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/commissioners/com-
missioner_chart_november_2018_0.pdf.
36 William E. Kovacic, George Washington University Law School, Presentation on Set-
ting the International Scene (Mar. 25, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/audio-
video/video/ftc-hearing-11-march-25-session-1-remarks-ftc-chairman-joe-simons.
37 Id.
38 Commissioners, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/commissioners
(last visited Sept. 9, 2020)
39 Id.
40 See Gellhorn et al., supra note 6, at 726.
41 Id.
42 See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 35.
43 See id.
44 15 U.S.C. § 42 (2018).
45 Id. § 41.
46 Or infamous, depending on whom you ask. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 725–26 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“One can hardly grieve for the shoddy treat-
ment given today to Humphrey’s Executor. . . .  But one must grieve for the Constitution.”).
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Executor to limit the power of the President to remove Commissioners to only
those deficiencies.47  This is a key feature of what makes the FTC “indepen-
dent;” the President cannot remove Commissioners simply for policy or
enforcement disagreements.48
There are multiple bureaus and offices within the FTC, including the
Bureau of Competition, the Bureau of Consumer Protection, the Bureau of
Economics, the Office of International Affairs, and the Office of Administra-
tive Law Judges.49  Administrative Law Judges (ALJs) preside over administra-
tive factfinding proceedings and issue initial decisions,50 and they too have
removal protections.  ALJs can only be removed “for good cause established
and determined by the Merit Systems Protection Board on the record after
opportunity for hearing before the Board.”51
2. Antitrust Enforcement Authority and Procedures
The FTC is empowered to enforce the Federal Trade Commission Act
and the Clayton Act, which confer only civil antitrust enforcement authority
to the Commission.52  As noted above, the FTC also shares jurisdiction with
the DOJ over mergers filed under the HSR Act.53  The FTC has the choice
between using its own internal administrative process or filing actions in a
federal district court.54  When the Commission pursues cases administra-
tively, parties can seek judicial review in the federal courts, but only after a
full investigation and administrative proceeding presided over by an ALJ.55
The ALJ issues an initial decision, which parties can appeal to the Commis-
sion, and, finally, to a federal court of appeals.56  The practices and proce-
dures of FTC administrative proceedings are codified in the agency’s “Rules
of Practice.”57  Parties before the FTC can object to subpoenas, second
requests, and CIDs only through internal petitions to the Commission.58
47 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 621–26 (1935).
48 Id. at 625–26.
49 Bureaus & Offices, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
50 Office of Administrative Law Judges, FED. TRADE COMM’N, ftc.gov/about-ftc/bureaus-
offices/office-administrative-law-judges (last visited Sept. 2, 2020).
51 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018).
52 See Statutes Enforced or Administered by the Commission, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://
www.ftc.gov/enforcement/statutes (last visited Sept. 2, 2020) [hereinafter Statutes Enforced
or Administered]; ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 129.
53 Statutes Enforced or Administered, supra note 52.
54 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TEMPLATE PURSUANT TO SECTION 3(a) OF THE ICN FRAMEWORK
ON COMPETITION AGENCY PROCEDURES 1.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 8–9.
57 Id. at 2.
58 Id. at 3.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 9 29-OCT-20 13:38
2020] ending  dual  federal  antitrust  authority 403
3. Potential Problems with Sole Enforcement Authority
Many criticisms of the FTC stem from its status as an independent
agency.  The Commission technically sits within the executive branch, but
neither the Commissioners nor its ALJs are subject to at-will removal by the
President.59  The Commission can be influenced by Congress through the
appropriations process, but its actions are not attributable to the legislative
branch.60  The independence of the Commission supposedly shields it from
unwanted political influence by Congress and the President, but as a result,
the FTC is also unaccountable to American consumers.  The advantages of
this political insulation are also unclear; though the Commission is theoreti-
cally bipartisan, it is not required to vote by consensus, and thus one party
almost always has a majority vote (regardless of whether it is the party of the
President).61
In addition, the FTC’s effective insulation from the President raises
potential problems in the realm of foreign policy, which is often implicated
by antitrust enforcement.62  In fact, as explained by Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral Makan Delrahim, “it would be inconsistent with our constitutional
framework—in particular, the role of the Executive Branch under Article
II—for the FTC to assert a policy position in an international forum that
contradicts the policy position of the United States.”63  And like the criticism
of the Antitrust Division’s absence of consumer protection authority, vesting
all civil antitrust authority in the FTC has been criticized due to the FTC’s
lack of criminal authority.64
The FTC’s authority to wield executive power has been subject to serious
constitutional challenges.  For example, in January of this year, Axon Enter-
prises Inc. filed a complaint in the District Court of Arizona seeking to enjoin
FTC administrative proceedings, making three constitutional claims: (1) that
having two levels of removal restrictions, insulating both the Commissioners
and the ALJs from at-will removal by the President, is unconstitutional; (2)
that the FTC’s roles as “prosecutor, judge, and jury” in its administrative pro-
ceedings violate the Due Process Clause; and (3) that the clearance process
used by the DOJ and FTC, which use different procedures and substantive
standards to conduct merger review, is arbitrary and violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause.65  These first two charges will be evaluated presently; the
third will be addressed in Part II.
59 See supra notes 45–51 and accompanying text.
60 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
61 See supra notes 38–44 and accompanying text.
62 Kovacic, supra note 5, at 537.
63 Interview by Douglas H. Ginsburg with Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t
of Just. (June 19, 2018), https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/cpi-talks-with-
makan-delrahim.
64 Kovacic, supra note 5, at 536.
65 Notice of Tentative Ruling, supra note 11, at 3.
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a. Agency Independence
Many recent changes in administrative law doctrine question the contin-
ued constitutionality of independent executive agencies.  As noted above, the
Court explicitly upheld the constitutionality of the for-cause removal protec-
tion of FTC Commissioners in Humphrey’s Executor.66  In that case, which
regarded a challenge to the removal of an FTC Commissioner, the Court
held that the removal restrictions were constitutional because the duties of
the FTC were “neither political nor executive, but predominantly quasi-judi-
cial and quasi-legislative.”67  The Court noted that the FTC’s “members are
called upon to exercise the trained judgment of a body of experts” and found
that full removal powers for the President would threaten the independence
of the agency.68
The jurisprudence of the Court underwent a striking shift in 2010 by way
of the case Free Enterprise Fund v. PCAOB.69  The Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) was an invention of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 to introduce “tighter regulation of the accounting industry.”70  The
PCAOB was placed under the oversight of the SEC, by whom its members
were appointed to five-year terms, and the PCAOB members themselves were
only removable by the SEC for good cause.71  And, like the FTC, the SEC is
an independent agency whose Commissioners are only removable for good
cause.72  The result was that both the Commissioners of the SEC and the
members of the PCAOB were insulated from the President through removal
restrictions.73  Additionally, the President could not even remove a PCAOB
member who he determined was neglecting his office because the removal
power over malfeasant Board members was lodged in the SEC, not the
President.74
The question of the PCAOB’s constitutionality was brought to the Court
by an accounting firm under formal investigation by the PCAOB.75  The firm
was seeking a declaratory judgment and an injunction on the theory that
“conferring wide-ranging executive power on Board members without sub-
jecting them to Presidential control” was unconstitutional.76  In considering
this structure in which the President is “restricted in his ability to remove a
principal officer, who is in turn restricted in his ability to remove an inferior
officer,” the Court found that such dual for-cause limitations “contravene[d]
66 Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626–32 (1935).
67 Id. at 624.
68 Id. at 624, 630.
69 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
70 Id. at 484.
71 Id. at 484–86 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 7211(e)(6), 7217(b)–(c) (2008)).
72 Id. at 487 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 620).
73 Id. at 486–87.
74 Id. at 484.
75 Id. at 487.
76 Id.
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the Constitution’s separation of powers.”77  The Court explained that “mul-
tilevel protection from removal is contrary to Article II’s vesting of the execu-
tive power in the President” because the President cannot “‘take Care that
the Laws be faithfully executed’ if he cannot oversee the faithfulness of the
officers who execute them.”78  The Court noted that this structure subverted
not only the President’s ability to ensure faithful execution, but also “the
public’s ability to pass judgment on his efforts.”79
In 2018, the Court decided another important case that bears on the
constitutionality of the FTC’s current structure.  In Lucia v. SEC, Petitioner
Raymond Lucia challenged the appointment of the ALJ who had imposed
sanctions “of $300,000 and a lifetime [ban] from the investment industry,”
arguing that the ALJ’s appointment by SEC staff members was unconstitu-
tional under the Appointments Clause.80  The Court found for the peti-
tioner, holding that the ALJs at the SEC were “Officers of the United States”
because ALJs exercise “significant authority pursuant to the laws of the
United States” and their offices are “continuing and permanent.”81  ALJs
were found to exercise “significant authority” because they exercise signifi-
cant discretion and have “nearly all the tools of federal trial judges”—taking
testimony, receiving evidence, examining witnesses, taking pretrial deposi-
tions, conducting trials, administering oaths, ruling on motions, regulating
the conduct of the parties at hearings, ruling on the admissibility of evidence,
shaping the administrative record, enforcing compliance with discovery
orders, punishing contempt, and issuing independent decisions.82  The
Court also emphasized that the SEC could choose to adopt the ALJ’s opinion
as final.83  Because the ALJ was an “Officer[ ] of the United States,” he must
be appointed by the President, a court of law, or a head of department, not
an SEC staff member.84  Although the Court in Lucia did not explicitly state
that the ALJs at agencies other than the SEC were “Officers of the United
States,” there is a strong argument that this holding would apply to the ALJs
77 Id. at 484, 492.
78 Id. at 484 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
79 Id. at 498.
80 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2049–50 (2018).
81 Id. at 2051 (first quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; and then quoting United States v.
Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 511–12 (1879); and then quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 126
(1976)).
82 Id. at 2051, 2053.
83 Id. at 2054 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 201.360(d)(2) (2017); 15 U.S.C. § 78(d)-1(c)
(2012)).
84 The Court did not explicitly decide whether ALJs were principal or inferior officers,
but because SEC ALJs are “Officers of the United States,” the Court held that they must be
appointed by the President, a court of law, or a head of department according to the
Appointments Clause of Article II. Id. at 2049–51.  All ALJs at the SEC had been
appointed by non-Commissioner SEC staff. Id. at 2049.  The Court found that the appro-
priate remedy would be “a new ‘hearing before a properly appointed’”  ALJ (who also
could not be the ALJ who presided over the original hearing, even if his appointment
defect was “cure[d]”). Id. at 2055 (quoting Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 183, 188
(1995)).
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at the FTC.85  The FTC’s ALJs have the “duty to conduct fair and impartial
hearings,” and wield analogous powers to those of the SEC ALJs, including
administering oaths, taking depositions, ruling on the admissibility of evi-
dence, receiving evidence, shaping the administrative record, regulating the
conduct of parties during the hearing, and suspending or barring attorneys
for misbehavior.86
In his partial concurrence in Lucia, Justice Breyer noted that if ALJs are
“Officers,” they may present a constitutional removal problem.87  Because
ALJs can only be removed “for cause” by the Merit Systems Protection Board,
who in turn may only be removed for cause by the President, this structure
presents the same dual for-cause limitation that was found unconstitutional
in Free Enterprise Fund.88  Justice Breyer warned that if Free Enterprise Fund’s
holding applied to ALJs, the Court risks “unraveling, step-by-step, the founda-
tions of the Federal Government’s administrative adjudication system as it
has existed for decades.”89  The ALJs at the FTC are also shielded by the
same statutory removal restrictions as the ALJs at the SEC.90
The majority opinion in Free Enterprise Fund explicitly stated that the
Court was not asked to reconsider Humphrey’s Executor by any of the parties.91
But the Plaintiffs in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB92 did ask,93 and in response the
Court significantly shrunk the strength of Humphrey’s Executor as a precedent
for the constitutionality of the FTC.
The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of
2010, which transferred the authority to administer eighteen existing statutes
to the newly created agency, vested the CFPB with “potent enforcement pow-
85 See Peter Isajiw et al., Cleanup on Title 5: Executive Agencies and Courts Begin to Unpack
Lucia, as Litigants Eye Challenges to Administrative State, BUS. L. TODAY (Sept. 26, 2018),
https://businesslawtoday.org/2018/09/cleanup-title-5-executive-agencies-courts-begin-
unpack-lucia-litigants-eye-challenges-administrative-state/.
86 Id. (quoting 16 C.F.R. § 3.42(c) (2017)).  The FTC, in response to a challenge to
the constitutionality of its current (and only) ALJ’s appointment, “ratified” the appoint-
ment just as the SEC did when the Lucia case was pending. Id.  The Court in Lucia did not
decide the issue of whether such “ratification” cures the Appointments Clause violation.
See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2055 n.6 (2018).
87 Lucia, 138 S. Ct. at 2057 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissent-
ing in part).
88 Id. at 2060 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2012)).
89 Id. at 2064.
90 See 5 U.S.C. § 7521(a) (2018).
91 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010) (“The
parties do not ask us to reexamine any of these precedents, and we do not do so.”).
92 140 S. Ct. 2183 (2020).
93 Petitioner in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB urged in its petition for certiorari that if the
Court “were to agree with the court of appeals that Humphrey’s Executor or Morrison are
controlling here, petitioner respectfully submits that, in light of their gross departure from
constitutional text, history, and the principles articulated in Myers, those cases should be
overruled or limited.”  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 24, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S.
Ct. 2183 (2020) (No. 19-7).
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ers.”94  “The agency has the authority to conduct investigations, issue subpoe-
nas and civil investigative demands, initiate administrative adjudications, and
prosecute civil actions in federal court.”95
The CFPB was designed as an independent agency with a single Direc-
tor.96  The Director is appointed by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, serving a term of five years.97  The President may only
remove the CFPB Director for “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance
in office.”98  As described by the Supreme Court, “[t]he CFPB Director has
no boss, peers, or voters to report to.  Yet the Director wields vast rulemaking,
enforcement, and adjudicatory authority over a significant portion of the
U.S. economy.”99  Seila Law LLC, a law firm subject to a civil investigative
demand by the CFPB, challenged the independent structure of the CFPB as a
violation of the separation of powers.100  The Court agreed with the firm,
holding that such executive power wielded by a single Director was
unconstitutional.101
The Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, took a
strong stance on the vesting of the executive power solely in the President,
describing Humphrey’s Executor as one of “only two exceptions to the Presi-
dent’s unrestricted removal power,” an exception that only applied to “multi-
member expert agencies that do not wield substantial executive power.”102
But the CFPB does wield substantial executive power; “the Director’s enforce-
ment authority includes the power to seek daunting monetary penalties
against private parties on behalf of the United States in federal court—a
quintessentially executive power not considered in Humphrey’s Executor.”103
Important to the question of the continued constitutionality of the FTC,
the Seila Law Court significantly constrained the reach of Humphrey’s Executor,
construing the eighty-five-year-old holding as one that only applied to the
“New Deal-era FTC”:104
Rightly or wrongly, the Court viewed the FTC (as it existed in 1935) as exer-
cising “no part of the executive power.”  Instead, it was “an administrative
body” that performed “specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid.”  It
acted “as a legislative agency” in “making investigations and reports” to Con-
gress and “as an agency of the judiciary” in making recommendations to
courts as a master in chancery.105
94 Seila Law LLC, 140 S. Ct. at 2193.
95 Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5562, 5564(a), (f) (2018)).
96 Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5491(b)(1) (2018)).
97 Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 5491(b)(2), (c)(1) (2018)).
98 Id. (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 5491(c)(3) (2018)).
99 Id. at 2191.
100 Id. at 2194.
101 Id. at 2197–207.
102 Id. at 2192, 2199–200.
103 Id. at 2200.
104 Id.
105 Id. at 2198 (citations omitted) (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S.
602, 628 (1935)).
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The dissent criticizes the majority’s suggestion that the FTC in 1935 might
have had less responsibilities than the FTC in 2020.  The Chief Justice
acknowledges this point: “Perhaps the FTC possessed broader rulemaking,
enforcement, and adjudicatory powers than the Humphrey’s Court appreci-
ated,” noted Roberts.106  “Perhaps not.”107
b. Due Process
Another constitutional concern raised by the FTC is the problem of due
process.  This is not a novel concern; “[t]he efficacy and basic fairness of the
Commission’s administrative adjudicatory procedures have . . . been a contin-
uing source of controversy.”108  In fact, William Simon made this argument
almost seventy years ago:
[T]here is little opportunity for a businessman to receive a fair and impartial
trial before the Federal Trade Commission. . . .  [H]earings are held before
one of the Commission’s trial examiners.  The attorneys who appear to sup-
port the Commission’s complaint are from its staff. . . .  [T]he examiner is
necessarily influenced by the fact that the Commissioners had reason to
believe that there was a violation of law.109
Similarly, Gellhorn and his coauthors argued in 1990 that while the DOJ
must prove all their cases to a federal judge, “[t]he FTC, at least until the very
last step, must only convince itself.”110  In 1989, the ABA’s Section of Anti-
trust Law reported that “between 1975 and 1988 the Commission took an
average of 15.1 months from oral argument to issuance of an FTC final
order . . . .  There is no excuse for taking more than a year to write an
opinion.”111
Possibly worse than the due process concerns raised by the FTC’s admin-
istrative processes is the Commission’s treatment of the constitutional claims
brought against it.  In its amicus brief supporting Axon Enterprises, the New
Civil Liberties Alliance (NCLA) noted that
[the] FTC requires all parties to waive any right to petition the circuit court
on their constitutional claims should they settle.  The Court should take
judicial notice of this practice.  We have a situation where the agency at issue
does not rule on constitutional issues, requires defendants who settle any
106 See id. at 2200 n.4.
107 See id.  This footnote on changed circumstances from Chief Justice Roberts is more
interesting if one considers his commentary on stare decisis in another opinion handed
down on the same day as Seila Law. See June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103,
2133–35 (2020) (Roberts, J., concurring).
108 Gellhorn et al., supra note 6, at 702.  Further, these authors noted that “[i]ndeed,
most commentators who have studied the question of dual enforcement seem to favor
transferring the FTC’s antitrust enforcement authority to DOJ.” Id.
109 Simon, supra note 6, at 335.
110 Gellhorn et al., supra note 6, at 721.
111 Miles W. Kirkpatrick et al., Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust
Law Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 43,
116 n.167 (1989).
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portion of the claim to waive subsequent federal-court review of constitu-
tional issues, and can moot any petition for review by failing to rule for itself.
Add to this the in terrorem effects of an agency that says divest your acquisi-
tion and transfer your intellectual property as we say, or we will tie you up in
administrative proceedings designed to favor FTC and extinguish your
claims altogether, and the lack of meaningful review is plain.112
NCLA further illustrated this problem with the story of LabMD.  The FTC
put LabMD through “an administrative hearing that was costly, long and bur-
densome;” as a result, LabMD “ceased business and was completely shut
down.”113  As it turns out, the ALJ ended up finding for LabMD, but the
Commission “voided the ALJ’s decision and issued its cease-and-desist
order.”114  LabMD appealed to the Eleventh Circuit and won on the only
issue decided by the court—the specificity of the FTC injunction.115  The
FTC did not file for a writ of certiorari.116  “Thus, after the destruction of the
company, its being subjected to an unconstitutional proceeding, and its hav-
ing ‘won’ because of the ridiculous unenforceability of the Order—the origi-
nal constitutional matters raised by LabMD were never addressed.  FTC’s
position was so unjustified that attorney’s fees were awarded.”117
II. PROBLEMS WITH THE DUAL ENFORCEMENT STRUCTURE
A. Traditional Criticisms
To put the problem of dual enforcement in the most general terms,
there is significant international and domestic consensus that having multi-
ple federal antitrust agencies is inefficient and undesirable.118  No other
leading antitrust enforcement country has more than one civil competition
112 Brief for New Civil Liberties Alliance as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff at 8,
Axon Enter. Inc. v. FTC, 452 F. Supp. 3d 882 (D. Ariz. 2020) (No. 20-cv-0014) (citations
omitted) (citing Plaintiff’s Consent Motion for Entry of Stipulated Order for Civil Penalty,
Monetary Judgment, and Injunctive Relief, and Memorandum in Support, United States v.
Facebook, Inc., No. 19-cv-2184 (D.D.C. July 24, 2019), ECF No. 2).
113 Id. at 9.
114 Id.
115 Id. at 10 (citing LabMD, Inc. v. FTC, 894 F.3d 1221 (11th Cir. 2018)).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 10.
118 But see Kovacic, supra note 5, at 510 (“One reason for having two agencies perform
the same government function is to foster interagency competition that increases the out-
put and improves the quality of the product that the agencies are intended to supply.”).
Kovacic notes that the primary form of competition between the two agencies is the com-
petition for preeminence. See id. at 524; see also Fox, supra note 6, at 487 (“[T]he sword of
Damocles over the head of the FTC (for the threat is usually to the FTC) seems to inspire
the FTC to new heights.”).  In 1996, Kovacic himself was unconvinced by this argument.
See Kovacic, supra note 5, at 539–40 (“I suspect that the careful empirical studies will con-
firm my intuition that the costs of dual enforcement by the DOJ and the FTC have
exceeded the benefits of competition and diversification in antitrust oversight by the fed-
eral government.”).  This piece was published before Kovacic himself served as a Commis-
sioner of the FTC from 2006–2011. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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agency; in fact, China, the United Kingdom, Brazil, and Portugal have all
recently condensed their duplicative antitrust agencies into singular antitrust
authorities.119  The current American system of two enforcement agencies
with “directly overlapping responsibilities” is “more the product of historical
accident than a conscious decision.”120  The sitting FTC Chairman and Assis-
tant Attorney General for the Antitrust Division have both said that they
would not split antitrust authority “if given a blank slate.”121
Among others, there are three commonly made arguments for why the
dual enforcement structure is inefficient and unfair: merger clearance
delays, different procedural standards, and the agencies’ enforcement of dif-
ferent substantive standards.  Each of these will be addressed in turn.
1. Merger Clearance Delays
The HSR Act only allots thirty days post-notification for merger review,
but the DOJ and FTC often take much of, or more than, the thirty days just
to decide which agency is going to investigate a merger.122  The Antitrust
Modernization Commission (AMC), which studied the problem of dual
enforcement in the mid-2000s, argued that this inefficiency places “signifi-
cant burdens on companies with time-sensitive transactions.”123  When the
agencies fail to come to a timely resolution, they frequently initiate second
requests that are expensive for parties to comply with.124  This is because,
prior to clearance, staffers “cannot reach out either to the merging compa-
nies or third parties,” and they frequently need more time than what is left
over of the thirty days to complete their review.125
Unlike disputes between other executive agencies, there is no way to
quickly resolve these disputes through the chain of command because the
FTC is not accountable to the President.  Assistant Attorney General Makan
Delrahim has stated that one standstill was solved with a coin toss.126  Axon
Enterprises called the clearance process an “uncodified black box” that can
have “real consequences” for parties.127  Such turf wars are a waste of taxpay-
119 See ELEANOR M. FOX & DANIEL A. CRANE, GLOBAL ISSUES IN ANTITRUST AND COMPETI-
TION LAW 487 (2d ed. 2018); Stephen Crosswell & Tom Jenkins, China to Integrate Its Three
Antitrust Agencies into a Single Authority, GLOB. COMPLIANCE NEWS (Mar. 26, 2018), https://
globalcompliancenews.com/china-antitrust-agencies-20180326/.
120 Gellhorn et al., supra note 6, at 714; see also id. at 716 (arguing that the legislative
history around the FTC does not definitively answer the question of whether the FTC was
meant to have concurrent enforcement authority with the DOJ).
121 Bryan Koenig, For DOJ and FTC, Clearing Deals Remains a Gray Area, LAW360 (Mar. 20,
2020), https://www.law360.com/articles/1255073/for-doj-and-ftc-clearing-deals-remains-a-
gray-area.
122 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 130, 151.
123 Id. at 130.
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ers’ resources and frequently shift considerable burdens to parties under
investigation.
2. Different Procedural Standards
Companies often feel that they are treated differently depending on
whether their case is assigned to the DOJ or the FTC.128  These perceptions
primarily stem from the fact that the DOJ and FTC pursue different injunc-
tive relief in federal court.129  In the case of anticompetitive mergers, the
DOJ pursues preliminary and permanent injunctions, which give parties
finality.130  The FTC, however, pursues only preliminary injunctions; regard-
less of the outcome of the injunction, the FTC then proceeds through a
lengthy administrative process for permanent relief.131  The AMC noted that
the “FTC’s ability to continue a merger case in administrative litigation . . .
may lead companies whose transactions are investigated by the FTC to feel
greater pressure to settle a matter than if they had been investigated by the
DOJ.”132  As a result, the agencies’ procedural differences “can undermine
the public’s confidence” in antitrust authorities.133
3. Different Substantive Standards
A third commonly made argument about the undesirability of the dual
enforcement structure is the uncertainty and cost to businesses seeking to
comply with both the DOJ and FTC when they apply different substantive
standards.134  The two agencies frequently disagree on legal standards, as evi-
denced by the amicus brief filed by the DOJ against the FTC in the
Qualcomm litigation,135 as well as broader antitrust policy.136  Is it fair to
128 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 130–31; see also Simon,
supra note 6, at 309 (“[The FTC] creates further problems for businessmen by requiring
conduct which the Department of Justice (Attorney General) prohibits.”).
129 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 138.
130 See id.
131 See id. at 138; see also H.R. REP. NO. 115–412, at 3 (2017) (footnotes omitted) (citing
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 141–42) (stating that although “[i]t is
difficult to quantify the degree to which the disparate preliminary injunction standards
yield different results,” there is “a perception that a disparate preliminary injunction stan-
dard exists.  Some commentators go as far as to suggest that the FTC may even be subject
to a more lenient standard than DOJ.”).
132 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 130–31.
133 Id. at 131.  For a potential legislative solution to this problem, see infra notes 173–76
and accompanying text.
134 See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 5, at 521 (“If agencies apply dissimilar analytical tech-
niques or standards,” one cost “is the expense that businesses incur to evaluate commercial
plans and strategies under both sets of enforcement approaches.”).
135 Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and
Vacatur supra note 10, at 1 (DOJ filing amicus brief against the FTC in the interest of
“correct application” of federal antitrust law).
136 For example, in recent years the two agencies publicly took different positions on
patent hold-up theory. See Makan Delrahim, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Just., Take It to
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companies that there is not always a unified, knowable antitrust position of
the United States?
The problem of differential substantive standards in dual enforcement
looms large in the current debates about antitrust enforcement and big tech,
especially in the current cases of Facebook, Google, Amazon, and Apple.137
These overlapping investigations raise the possibility that the DOJ and FTC
might not only present different litigating positions of the United States on
certain topics, but the agencies might actually enforce different substantive
standards on shared plaintiffs.  When both the FTC and the DOJ, in addition
to states and congressional committees, are inquiring into internet platforms,
companies “‘trying to make decisions with some level of comfort and cer-
tainty’ are finding out that there is little of either.”138
The Qualcomm litigation is further evidence of the undesirability of
competing antitrust policy visions.  This litigation arose out of the fundamen-
tal disagreements between the FTC and DOJ on the relationship between
antitrust and intellectual property law.  Qualcomm  sells chips used in mod-
ern cellphones to manufacturers and licenses patents which are essential to
certain cellphone technology standards.139  The FTC sued Qualcomm, argu-
ing that because the company’s chips were the standard for cellphones, the
company had a duty to makes its chips available for licensing.140  The DOJ
disagreed, arguing in its amicus brief against the FTC that Qualcomm’s
refusal to license was justified by its patents.141  This conflict, if the FTC were
not independent, would normally have been resolved through the Executive
Branch’s interagency dispute resolution process.  Instead, the conflict had to
be litigated, at the expense of the party trying to compete in the interna-
tional market and comply with American antitrust law.
the Limit: Respecting Innovation Incentives in the Application of Antitrust Law (Nov. 10,
2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-makan-delrahim-
delivers-remarks-usc-gould-school-laws-center (DOJ’s position); Terrell McSweeny,
Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Holding the Line on Patent Holdup: Why Antitrust
Enforcement Matters (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/pub-
lic_statements/1350033/mcsweeny_-_the_reality_of_patent_hold-up_3-21-18.pdf (FTC’s
position); FED. TRADE COMM’N, STANDARDS, LICENSING, AND INNOVATION: A RESPONSE TO
DOJ AAG’S COMMENTS ON ANTITRUST LAW AND STANDARD-SETTING (2018), https://
www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2018/08/ftc-2018-0055-d-0031-
155033.pdf (noting the difference).
137 Ylan Mui, Congress is Getting Ready to Grill Top DOJ and FTC Officials About Being Too
Lenient on Big Tech, CNBC (Sept. 17, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/09/17/congress-
to-grill-doj-delrahim-ftc-simons-on-big-tech-enforcement.html.
138 Brody & McLaughlin, supra note 2.
139 Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant and
Vacatur, supra note 10, at 2.
140 John O. McGinnis & Linda Sun, Justice-FTC Feud Is the Wrong Kind of Competition,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 13, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-ftc-antitrust-feud-is-the-
wrong-kind-of-competition-11597336577.
141 Id.; Brief of the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant
and Vacatur, supra note 10, at 8–13.
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B. Constitutional Problems
1. Equal Protection
As mentioned previously, the third and final constitutional claim made
by Axon Enterprises is one of Equal Protection.142  Axon claims that the gov-
ernment treatment of companies in the merger-clearance process is arbitrary
and violates even rational basis review.143  Axon alleges that there are “out-
come-determinative differences between merger challenges by the DOJ
under the Clayton Act and by the FTC under the FTC Act” and that these
differences in treatment put merging parties under review by the FTC at a
disadvantage.144  The complaint lists important differences between the two
agencies, including the forum for adjudicating the merits, the independence
of the factfinder, the substantive test of a violation, the result if a U.S. district
court denies a preliminary injunction, the applicable procedural and eviden-
tiary rules, the capacity to alter the merits decision prior to circuit court
appeal, and the circuit court appellate review standards.145  That final differ-
ence is especially crucial for parties; circuit courts review successful merger
challenges by the DOJ under the clearly erroneous standard, while FTC deci-
sions are upheld if there is “substantial evidence” in the record supporting
the decision.146  ALJs play a crucial role in shaping that record.147
This constitutional argument does not rely on any modern doctrinal
changes; instead, it reflects many of the traditional arguments about the lack
of fairness in the dual enforcement structure.  As explained in Section I.B of
142 See supra note 65 and accompany text.  Of course, the text of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause only applies to the states.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Although the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, does not
include an explicit equal protection clause, the Court has held that “[e]qual protection
analysis in the Fifth Amendment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.”  Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995) (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976)); see also Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (“[T]he
concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming from our American ideal of
fairness, are not mutually exclusive.”).
143 Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Supporting Memorandum of
Points and Authorities at 9, Axon Enter. Inc. v. FTC, 452 F. Supp. 3d 882 (D. Ariz. 2020)
(No. 20-cv-0014) (“The Equal Protection Clause secures every person against intentional
and arbitrary discrimination by the Government and promises equal justice under law.”
(citing Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota Cnty., 260 U.S. 441, 446 (1923)).
144 Id.
145 Id. at 10–12.  By “difference in result if a U.S. district court rules against a merger
challenge,” Axon is referring to the fact that if the district court rules against the DOJ for
an injunction, all the DOJ can do is appeal to a circuit court; the FTC, however, can still
put companies through its administrative processes. See supra notes 128–33 and accompa-
nying text.
146 Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Supporting Memorandum of
Points and Authorities, supra note 143, at 12.
147 See Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053 (2018) (noting that ALJs receive evidence,
“rule on the admissibility of evidence,” and “shape the administrative record” (quoting
Freytag v. Comm’r of Internal Revenue, 501 U.S. 868, 882 (1991)).
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this Note, the due process concerns arising from the FTC’s administrative
processes are significant.  The thrust of this equal protection claim is that
parties in front of the FTC receive less procedural protection than those in
front of the DOJ, are subjected to different substantive standards, and have
less opportunity for judicial review.  Because the merger clearance process is
one of discretion (and, in the case of a coin toss,148 arbitrariness), Axon is
right to argue that this arbitrary government action has real consequences
for parties undergoing merger review before the agencies.
2. Recent Doctrinal Changes
Dual antitrust enforcement faces new challenges due to the recent doc-
trinal changes that project a waning confidence in the constitutionality of the
FTC’s structure, independence, and processes.149  Any aggrieved party who
loses its case in FTC administrative proceedings would stand to gain by chal-
lenging the processes and structure of the Commission.150
The Take Care Clause has also been recently invoked as a limit on the
independence of executive officers, as seen in Morrison and Free Enterprise
Fund.  In both cases, the Court used a text-based functional test, asking if
Congress had interfered with the President’s “constitutionally appointed duty
to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed.’”151  Although those cases
considered removal restrictions, the same argument could be presented
regarding whether the combination of the FTC’s (a) independence and (b)
overlapping civil antitrust jurisdiction with the DOJ “interfere[s] impermissi-
bly with [the President’s] constitutional obligation to ensure the faithful exe-
cution of the laws.”152  This will be especially relevant in antitrust
enforcement cases that implicate foreign policy.153
As previously explained, Lucia and Free Enterprise Fund suggest that the
current removal restrictions of the FTC’s ALJs are unconstitutional.154  That
alone is a sufficient challenge to the constitutionality of the administrative
148 See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
149 See supra subsection I.B.3.
150 See Isajiw et al., supra note 85 (noting that “the Supreme Court [in Lucia] left open
the possibility that a private litigant may contend that it has standing to challenge the
constitutionality of the removal restrictions in an attempt to have an enforcement action
declared invalid”).  Less than a month after Lucia was decided, President Trump signed an
executive order that exempted all ALJs from the civil service requirements; this order did
not, however, alter the statutory provision governing the removal of ALJs. Id.
151 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 690 (1988) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); see
Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 484 (2010) (citing Morrison,
487 U.S. at 693).
152 Morrison, 487 U.S. at 693.
153 See Interview by Douglas H. Ginsburg with Makan Delrahim, supra note 63; see also
Spectrum Stores, Inc. v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 632 F.3d 938, 943 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding
that a private antitrust suit against foreign, nationally owned oil companies engaged in
price fixing “deeply implicate concerns of foreign and defense policy” and barring the suit
on the jurisdictional political question doctrine).
154 See supra notes 69–91 and accompanying text.
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processes at the FTC, which uses ALJs for factfinding and the issuance of
initial decisions.  But if ALJ removal restrictions are erased, so too will any
semblance of ALJ independence from the Commission.  This will heighten
due process concerns of the FTC serving as “ ‘prosecutor, judge, and jury’
during administrative proceedings.”155
As noted by Justice Breyer in Lucia, the potential application of the Free
Enterprise Fund holding to ALJs risks “unraveling” the “administrative adjudi-
cation system as it has existed for decades.”156 Seila Law moves such an
unraveling one notch forward.  At oral arguments, it was contended that the
Court has “essentially disemboweled the reasoning of” Humphrey’s Executor.157
If that was not true before, it certainly is now.  Not only is the independence
of the Commission’s ALJs in question, but the independence of the FTC
itself is unlikely to withstand future scrutiny.158  Because the CFPB is an inde-
pendent agency headed by a single director, rather than a multimember
commission like the FTC, finding the CFPB to be unconstitutional did not
require the Court to overrule Humphrey’s Executor.159  But future litigants
against the FTC will certainly give the Court an opportunity to do so.  Ten
years after the Court noted that the “parties [did] not ask us to reexamine”
Humphrey’s Executor,160 we might finally find out what happens when they do.
III. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEMS OF DUAL ENFORCEMENT
A. Elimination of the FTC’s Enforcement Authority
The strongest statutory fix to the problem of dual enforcement would be
to strip either the DOJ or FTC of their civil antitrust authority.  As noted in
Part I, giving sole civil antitrust authority to either agency presents a set of
traditional concerns and criticisms.  The Antitrust Division of the DOJ is
accountable to the President, and thus at risk for being used as a political
tool; it uses nonexpert judges for enforcement of complex, economic cases;
and it does not have consumer protection authority.161  The FTC is not
accountable to the President, and thus its enforcement power creates foreign
policy concerns, as well as concerns about being accountable to voters; its
administrative processes are subject to viable criticism regarding the due pro-
cess they afford; and it lacks criminal authority.162  But deciding which
agency should be vested with the sole antitrust enforcement authority of the
United States, if Congress chose to make such a change, does not require a
155 Notice of Tentative Ruling, supra note 11, at 3.
156 Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2064 (2018) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part
and dissenting in part).
157 Transcript of Oral Argument at 19–20, Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183
(2020) (No. 19-7); Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
158 See supra Section I.B.
159 See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 26.
160 Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Acct. Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 483 (2010).
161 See supra subsection I.A.3.
162 See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text; supra sub-subsection I.B.2.b.
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judgment of which of the above sets of concerns are weightier.163  The new
constitutional challenges facing the FTC tip the scale in favor of the DOJ.
The argument to vest the United States’ civil antitrust enforcement
authority solely in the DOJ is neither novel nor untenable.164  William Simon
made this argument in 1952 in his article The Case Against the Federal Trade
Commission, writing
The Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission have virtually con-
current jurisdiction to enforce the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts.  The
same statutes may in effect be enforced against the same businessmen by two
different agencies of the government.  Worse, these agencies appear to have
conflicting economic philosophies and diverse views of . . . antitrust laws.
The result is an inconsistent, irresponsible, and inefficient antitrust enforce-
ment program, with a failure to give the taxpayers maximum accomplish-
ment for Congressional antitrust appropriations.
. . . [T]he only tenable solution is to take antitrust jurisdiction away
from the Federal Trade Commission and to give exclusive antitrust jurisdic-
tion to the Attorney General.165
Although the Antitrust Modernization Commission and others have con-
cluded that it is too politically costly to consolidate these two agencies after
100 years of overlapping jurisdiction,166 many of the United States’ peer
countries have consolidated their competition agencies in the last decade.167
As detailed in this Note, the costs of dual enforcement are too great, and if
the United States wants to continue to be a global leader in antitrust, it may
163 Several commentators have made such a judgment and called for sole enforcement
authority to be granted to the DOJ. See, e.g., Kovacic, supra note 5, at 536 (“The need to
relate criminal enforcement to other elements of federal antitrust policy arguably creates a
presumption favoring consolidation of antitrust authority in DOJ.”); id. at 537 (“Because
these initiatives have important foreign policy implications, it is difficult to imagine a con-
solidation solution that locates antitrust enforcement authority outside the executive
branch.”); Simon, supra note 6, at 297 (arguing that President Hoover’s call for “[c]learer
lines of responsibility and authority” in the Executive branch “could best be achieved by
vesting unified authority in the Attorney General”).
164 But see Kovacic, supra note 5, at 507 (“The most frequently suggested change—fold-
ing the FTC’s antitrust resources into the DOJ—is usually scorned as hopelessly naive.”).
165 Simon, supra note 6, at 297 (footnotes omitted); see also Kovacic, supra note 5, at 540
(noting that if the choice was made to end the dual enforcement system in the United
States, the DOJ was “the best locus for consolidation”).
166 The AMC recommended no comprehensive change to the dual enforcement struc-
ture, noting that “[a]lthough concentrating enforcement authority in a single agency gen-
erally would be a superior institutional structure, the significant costs and disruption of
moving to a single-agency system at this point in time would likely exceed the benefits.”
ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 129–30 (footnotes omitted).  Addi-
tionally, the AMC noted that there is no consensus regarding whether it would be better to
eliminate the antitrust authority of the DOJ or the FTC. Id. at 130.
167 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
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become critical to have one efficient, authoritative agency that speaks for the
United States.168
This proposal is actually in harmony with President Wilson’s original
vision for the FTC, which was not for the FTC to be a separate law enforce-
ment agency, but an agency whose “principal function was to aid the DOJ
and the courts in conducting investigations and supervising the dissolution of
trusts found to be unlawful.”169  This would allow the FTC to be an expert
body without the problem of dual enforcement.  It would also cure the constitu-
tional issues of removal restrictions, due process, and equal protection that
were presented in Parts I and II of this Note.170
Senator Josh Hawley released a proposal in February of this year to con-
solidate the two agencies by moving the FTC inside the DOJ, replacing the
multimember commission with a single director who would report to the
Associate Attorney General (the same officer to which the head of the Anti-
trust Division of the DOJ reports).171  This would allow the FTC and DOJ to
coexist as separate, peer divisions, both under the direction of the Attorney
General.  Further, Hawley’s proposal would end jurisdictional overlap by
transferring all authority to review mergers and acquisitions to the DOJ,
while the FTC would “aid and support” the DOJ’s work.172  Hawley also sug-
gests creating a new “Digital Market Research Section” in the FTC to conduct
“comprehensive studies about digital markets” and support enforcement liti-
gation at the DOJ.173
This proposal and others might become more attractive to Congress in
light of the CFPB’s new lack of independence.174  If Congress does not want
an agency that answers to the President to be vested with the power that is
currently vested in the CFPB, Congress will have to restructure consumer
protection enforcement.  Such legislative momentum gives Congress a
168 See Lee, supra note 1 (“Enforcement of the antitrust laws is critical to safeguarding
competitive markets that benefit consumers.  Congress should focus on ensuring that anti-
trust enforcement efforts are backed by appropriate resources.  One way to further that
goal would be to reorganize civil antitrust enforcement so that it is done under one roof.
Doing so would result in more coherent, efficient, and effective antitrust enforcement.”).
169 Gellhorn et al., supra note 6, at 715.
170 Of course, the dubious constitutionality of the removal restrictions protecting FTC
Commissioners and ALJs would still be present if the FTC continued to have separate
enforcement power over consumer protection statutes.
171 Josh Hawley, A Proposal from Sen. Josh Hawley: Overhauling the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, HAWLEY.SENATE, https://www.hawley.senate.gov/overhauling-federal-trade-commis-
sion (last visited Sept. 9, 2020); see also Lauren Feiner, Republican Senator Proposes
Overhauling FTC and Making it Part of the DOJ to Take on Big Tech, CNBC (Feb. 10, 2020),
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/02/10/senator-hawley-proposes-putting-the-ftc-under-doj-
control.html.
172 Hawley, supra note 171.
173 Id.
174 See supra notes 94–104 and accompanying text.  The Court found that the removal
restrictions were severable, leaving the CFPB in place but accountable to the President. See
Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2209–10 (2020).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\96-1\NDL108.txt unknown Seq: 24 29-OCT-20 13:38
418 notre dame law review [vol. 96:1
chance to rethink the FTC’s role in consumer protection, and possibly its
overlapping jurisdiction with the DOJ.
B. Other Solutions
1. For Traditional Concerns
In the alternative, this Note proposes smaller legislative changes
designed to tackle some of the discrete problems of dual enforcement.  As
recommended by the AMC in 2007, Congress could enact legislation that
specifies a new, short time period by which the DOJ and FTC must clear
mergers.175  This would prevent merger clearance disputes from intruding
on the thirty-day postnotification merger-review period provided by the HSR
Act, as well as allow parties with time-sensitive mergers to proceed more
quickly.
Considering the problem of the FTC’s lack of accountability to the Presi-
dent, the HSR Act could also be amended to give the President a tiebreaker
vote regarding contentious merger clearances.  Although this would impinge
on the independence of the FTC as currently designed, it seems to be a bet-
ter resolution method than a coin toss.
In May of 2018, the SMARTER (Standard Merger and Acquisition
Reviews Through Equal Rules) Act was passed in the House of Representa-
tives and introduced to the Senate by Senators Lee, Hatch, Tillis, and
Grassley.176  It aims to eliminate the differential procedural treatment of
mergers challenged by the FTC and DOJ under the HSR Act.177  The
SMARTER Act requires the FTC to try its merger-review cases in federal
court, eliminating the Commission’s ability to adjudicate such cases through
administrative proceedings.178  Through this change, the SMARTER Act
would also eliminate the difference in appellate standards of review.  In sup-
port of the SMARTER Act, Senator Hatch urged that “[b]usinesses seeking to
merge deserve consistent treatment without regard to which agency decides
to review the merger.”179  There has been no action taken on this bill in the
Senate since its introduction.
Alternatively, the political branches could restructure the FTC’s budget,
making the agency financially dependent on congressional appropriations
and thus reducing its independence.  This would give Congress the discre-
tion to refrain from appropriating funds for FTC antitrust enforcement (and
to increase funding for DOJ antitrust enforcement).  Such an amendment
175 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 131–32.
176 Standard Merger and Acquisition Reviews Through Equal Rules Act of 2018, S.
2847, 115th Cong. (2018).
177 Id.
178 Id.  Such a change was also recommended by the AMC. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZA-
TION COMM’N, supra note 6, at 131–32.
179 Press Release, Sens. Lee, Hatch, Tillis, and Grassley Introduce SMARTER Act (May
15, 2018), https://www.lee.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2018/5/sens-lee-hatch-tillis-and-
grassley-introduce-smarter-act.
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could be modeled off of the proposed legislative reforms of the CFPB’s
budget.180
2. For Constitutional Concerns
Some of the constitutional concerns created by the current dual enforce-
ment structure are cured by the legislative solutions already listed.  Eliminat-
ing the FTC’s antitrust enforcement authority cures all of the constitutional
issues raised in this Note.  The SMARTER Act attends to equal protection
complaints about the merger-clearance process.  An amendment to the HSR
Act that gives the President a tiebreaker vote starts to cure the constitutional
concern that the dual enforcement structure intrudes on the President’s abil-
ity to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”181
Additionally, the ALJ statute could be amended to abolish ALJ removal
restrictions to solve the new constitutional concern created by the combina-
tion of the Free Enterprise Fund and Lucia holdings.  Congress could also pass a
statute to reform the FTC’s administrative processes in order to afford more
procedural protections to the parties before the Commission.
The problem of different substantive standards, however, seems more
challenging to fix through piecemeal attempts at harmonizing the work of
the FTC and DOJ.  As long as there are two autonomous agencies who wield
overlapping civil antitrust enforcement authority, there will be two sets of
substantive standards enforced on the parties before them.
CONCLUSION
Although the debates surrounding the overlapping jurisdiction of the
DOJ and FTC are not novel, this particular historical moment provides an
opportunity to reevaluate the wisdom of the status quo.  Several Supreme
Court cases in the last decade raise significant doubts of the constitutionality
of the current regime, and leading Republicans and Democrats in the Senate
have called for significant antitrust reform, especially in response to the chal-
lenges posed by Big Tech.182
180 See, e.g., OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, A BUDGET FOR AMERICA’S FUTURE:
MAJOR SAVINGS AND REFORMS, FISCAL YEAR 2021 185 (2020) (“The Budget proposes legisla-
tive reforms to restructure and bring accountability to the CFPB.  The proposed reforms
would reinforce financial discipline, reduce unnecessary spending, and ensure appropriate
congressional oversight by subjecting the CFPB to discretionary appropriations starting in
2022.  The proposal would also cap transfers by the Federal Reserve Board to the CFPB
during 2021 to $485 million, equivalent to the 2015 level.  These changes would allow the
CFPB to focus its efforts on enforcing enacted consumer protection laws.”).
181 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
182 See, e.g., Hawley, supra note 171; Lee, supra note 1; Chris Mills Rodrigo, Klobuchar
Introduces Bill to Strengthen Antitrust Enforcement, HILL (Mar. 10, 2020), https://thehill.com/
regulation/technology/486866-klobuchar-introduces-bill-to-strengthen-antitrust-enforce-
ment; Elizabeth Warren, Here’s How We Can Break Up Big Tech, MEDIUM (Mar. 8, 2019),
https://medium.com/@teamwarren/heres-how-we-can-break-up-big-tech-9ad9e0da324c.
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The strongest solution is to finally reverse the “historical accident” of the
overlapping civil antitrust jurisdiction of the DOJ and FTC.183  The United
States should have a singular, unified voice regarding civil antitrust enforce-
ment; this is especially relevant when swift, collaborative action with other
agencies and nations is needed.184  Smaller legislative changes are available,
but will not ultimately solve the traditional or constitutional problems of dual
enforcement.  As Senator Lee noted of the SMARTER Act, such statutes
“really just address[ ] a symptom and not the cause of the underlying
problem.”185
Legislators should make use of this moment of bipartisan focus on anti-
trust laws and enforcement structures to reshape American antitrust to be
responsive to modern challenges and consistent with the Court’s current
understanding of the separation of powers.
183 Gellhorn et al., supra note 6, at 714.
184 See, e.g., Joint Antitrust Statement Regarding COVID-19, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://
www.justice.gov/atr/joint-antitrust-statement-regarding-covid-19?utm_medium=email
&amp;utm_source=govdelivery (May 1, 2020).
185 Lee, supra note 1.
